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ABSTRACT 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE 
 
Aslı Unan 
M.A. Political Science, 2016 
 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Işık Özel 
 
 
Keywords: Regulatory independence, independent regulatory agencies, measurement 
 
 
Although regulatory agencies have been established in many middle-income countries under 
the influence of similar external actors as well as the market pressures since the 1990s, the 
levels of regulatory independence of these agencies vary considerably across countries and 
across time within the same countries. This research explores the variation in the degree of 
independence of regulatory agencies across countries and time by measuring regulatory 
independence in telecommunication sector of 36 middle income countries. It looks into 
economic, political and market-based indicators as explanatory factors of the variation in the 
degree of independence. Cross-national results indicate that the freedom in political rights, 
democracy level and investment freedom have a positive impact on the agency independence 
whereas state ownership in the sector and presidential form of government correlates with 
independence negatively. Contrary to studies on advanced economies, it does not find any 
statistically significant impact of income level, rule of law and number of veto players on 
regulatory independence. Cross-temporal analysis, looking at four countries’ formal 
independence mechanisms from 2006 to 2016, demonstrates that formal independence 
cannot be preserved as once and for all. Following political and economic uncertainties, 
governments who were willing to delegate authority to independent regulators may 
undermine not only de facto, but also formal independence of agencies over time through 
means of budget control, dispossession of competences and autonomy loss in decision 
making. 
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ÖZET 
 
DÜZENLEYİCİ KURUM BAĞIMSIZLIĞI ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR 
ANALİZ 
 
Aslı Unan 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016 
Doç. Dr. Işık Özel 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Düzenleyici kurum bağımsızlığı, bağımsızlık ölçümü, bağımsız 
düzenleyici ve denetleyici kurumlar 
 
 
Düzenleyici kurumlar 1990’lardan beri pek çok orta gelirli ülkede benzer dış aktörlerin etkisi 
ve piyasa baskıları altında kurulmuş olmalarına rağmen, bu kurumların bağımsızlık düzeyleri 
ülkeler arası ve zaman içinde önemli ölçüde değişiklik göstermektedir. Bu tez, 36 orta gelirli 
ülkenin telekomünikasyon sektöründe düzenleyici kurum bağımsızlığını ölçerek ülkeler arası 
ve zaman içinde düzenleyici kurumların bağımsızlık derecesindeki farklılaşmanın 
nedenlerini araştırıyor. Bağımsızlık derecesindeki varyasyonun sebepleri olarak ekonomik, 
siyasi ve piyasa temelli göstergelere bakıyor. Ülkeler-arası yapılan analiz sonuçlarına göre, 
siyasal hak özgürlüğü, demokrasi düzeyi ve yatırım özgürlüğü kurum bağımsızlığı ile pozitif 
bir korelasyon gösterirken, sektördeki devlet mülkiyeti ve başkanlık sistemi bağımsızlığı 
olumsuz etkiliyor. Gelişmiş ekonomiler üzerine yapılan çalışmaların aksine, bu çalışma gelir 
düzeyinin düzenleyici bağımsızlık üzerinde bir etkisini bulmuyor. Zamansal analiz, 2006- 
2015 yılları arasında dört ülkenin (Fas, Mısır, Tunus, Ürdün) telekomünikasyon sektöründeki 
düzenleyici kurum bağımsızlığı mekanizmalarına bakarak, literatürdeki fonksiyonel 
yaklaşımın varsayımlarının aksine, biçimsel bağımsızlığın da yıllar içinde değişebildiğini 
gösteriyor. Kurumların biçimsel bağımsızlık derecesi, siyasi ve ekonomik belirsizlikleri 
takiben, bütçe kontrolü, fiilen zayıflatma veya karar verme yetkisini elinden alma gibi 
yöntemlerle azaltılabiliyor. Hükümetlerin AB düzenleyici çerçevesine bağlılığı düzenleyici 
bağımsızlığı korumada rol oynuyor. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In the recent decades, a general trend towards expanding regulation as a tool of governance 
in the areas of social and economic policy has proceeded with the establishment of 
independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Independent regulatory agencies have spread in 
many parts of the world and became central features of governance in many advanced and 
developing economies (Cook et al.2004; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005, 2011). With respect 
to rule of law, courts, markets and stock exchanges though, developing economies had 
relatively weaker institutional structures in their governance models. After the introduction 
of systematic sectoral privatization and liberalization initiatives, independent regulatory 
agencies were identified as prominent institutions of good governance for regulatory reforms 
and promoted by organizations such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the 
OECD for the developing economies. Governance through independent regulatory agencies 
became a central feature of regulatory reforms all around the world. 
 
Although regulatory agencies have been established in many middle-income countries under 
the influence of similar external actors as well as the market pressures since the 1990s, the 
levels of regulatory independence of these agencies vary considerably across countries and 
across time within the same countries. This thesis particularly tackles this specific question: 
what explains variation regarding regulatory independence in the middle income countries? 
Employing a quantitative method on cross-national analysis, it suggests that middle income 
countries with greater levels of democracy, political rights and investment freedom and with 
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lower levels of state ownership in the respective market delegate more authority to their 
regulatory agencies. Contrary to findings for advanced economies, it does not find a 
statistically significant impact of income level, rule of law and number of veto players on 
regulatory independence. Further, it demonstrates that countries with presidential regimes 
delegate less authority to IRAs in middle-income economies. Complementing the findings 
of the quantitative analysis with a cross-temporal qualitative analysis on four case studies, 
it also argues that regulatory independence cannot be preserved once and for all. Following 
political and economic uncertainties, governments who were willing to delegate authority to 
independent regulators may undermine not only de facto, but also formal independence of 
agencies over time through means of budget control, dispossession of competences and 
autonomy loss in decision making. 
 
Previous studies display the persistence of significant variation in the institutional design of 
regulatory agencies in a comparative fashion, but they mostly focus on countries situated 
in the same region (see Jordana and Levi-Faur for Latin America, 2005; Gilardi, 2002 and 
Hanretty and Koop, 2013 for Europe). This thesis, instead, scrutinizes regulatory agencies 
from several developing economies in different regions to see how dissimilar economic, 
political and market environments shape the institutional design of regulatory agencies. In 
order to assess how IRAs have been studied for advanced economies and show how these 
studies can or cannot explain the pattern, trend and variation of agency independence in 
developing economies, it also reviews the related theoretical and empirical literature up to 
date. 
 
This thesis specifically focuses on telecommunications market to observe regulatory 
independence. The particular attention is paid to the conditions under which regulatory 
independence differs. Prior to the telecommunications sector reforms, telecommunications 
services were largely provided under monopoly conditions, either by state entities or by 
private companies. Through the waves of liberalization, many independent agencies in 
utilities sectors have been established to fulfill the purpose of an “effective regulatory 
framework for the public utilities to be applicable to the private sector operators and to 
promote competition and regulate monopolies” (OECD, 2013: 63). As one of the utilities 
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sectors, telecommunications market makes a good case to observe regulatory independence 
because (I) it is one of the first sectors in which IRAs were introduced; (II) many developing 
economies have created IRAs during the widespread diffusion of the regulatory agencies to 
catch up with the global trends1; and (III) this sector has developed its own international 
organizations specialized for information and communication technologies which makes it 
possible to achieve recent data on regulatory agencies worldwide. To determine the level of 
regulatory independence for each telecom agency, this thesis uses Gilardi (2002) index which 
is a conventional tool in the literature to measure the level of IRA independence.  
 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. In this introductory chapter, I have illustrated the 
rationale for studying the independence of regulatory agencies for telecommunications 
market and in middle-income countries2. I have discussed how the study of IRAs for the 
telecommunications market in middle income economies is particularly necessary, and 
presented the major research question which I aim to answer in this work. 
 
Aiming to investigate the variation in independence of IRAs across nations, Chapter 2 builds 
a theoretical foundation with respect to fundamental literature engaging in the determinants 
of agency independence and develops hypotheses as regards economic development, 
political system and market structure. It overviews the operationalization of the measurement 
of the degree of independence of regulatory agencies. 
 
Chapter 3 presents and explains data collection and methodology of this thesis. Offering a 
cross-country analysis of the new data over 36 countries3, Chapter 4 discusses the results of 
statistical analysis and breaks down the bivariate relationship between formal independence 
and each independent variable. Examining the respective importance of political, economic 
and market-based factors, this study finds out that while in advanced economies rule of law 
is the most significant explanatory factor behind regulatory independence, freedom in 
                                                
1 But some governments have incorporated the concept of formal agency independence much less enthusiastically than 
others (see Bianculli et al., 2013) 
2 I use middle income economies and developing economies interchangeably. 
3 See Appendix B for the list of the countries. 
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political rights has the greatest explanatory power to explain independence in the case of 
developing economies. 
 
Along with cross-country variation, another aim of this thesis is to understand the formal 
change in IRA independence over time. It intends to complement the quantitative findings of 
this thesis with qualitative case studies. It selects Southern European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP) countries to observe the variation in regulatory independence. The ENP offers 
financial assistance to its neighbors in the South in return for reform in specific policies, one 
of which is electronic communication policy and regulation. To that end, countries commit 
to reform telecommunications framework and promote politically independent regulatory 
agencies in this sector. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are the four ENP-South countries 
observed in this thesis to understand the driving factors of regulatory change in time, if there 
is any. It also touches upon the (ir)reversibility of the reforms pressured by the ENP. Chapter 
5 thus observes this phenomenon by focusing on three explanatory variables of formal change 
in time: (1) political change, (2) economic freedom and (3) commitment to EU regulatory 
directive. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses and compares the determinants of the formal change in regulatory 
independence in aforementioned countries. It also brings quantitative cross-national and 
qualitative cross-temporal case study results together to comprehensively understand the 
pattern of variation in regulatory independence of developing economies. It puts the 
limitations of this study forth and concludes. Throughout the thesis, special attention is paid 
to show how political and economic environment along with market structure of the 
respective sector affect states’ behavior vis-à-vis their regulatory agencies. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Regulatory Independence 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to resolve the determinants of the variation in the degrees of 
regulatory independence. This chapter presents three clusters of determinants:  economic 
development, political system and market structure. It introduces the literature up to date 
regarding the determinants of regulatory independence and develops hypotheses 
accordingly. 
 
 
2.1 Economic Development 
 
Regulatory institutions are identified as market-supporting mechanisms (Rodrik, 2007). 
Current systems of governance require that a successful market economy is overseen by 
regulatory institutions, either by autonomous regulatory agencies or governmental bodies. 
Regulatory agencies, as the most featured institutions of the regulatory governance 
throughout the world, are the bodies responsible for regulation in widespread areas of goods, 
utilities and financial markets. Rodrik (2007: 157) conceives that ‘the freer are the markets, 
the greater is the burden on the regulatory institutions’. Thus, open market economies tend 
to recognize the need to create regulatory bodies for several sectors as it is currently the case 
in almost every market economy. The regulatory burden on the regulatory bodies in 
countries with freer economies will be greater because of the variety of the sectors and the 
greater number of firms in these sectors. In an economically free country, there would be no 
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constraints on the flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would be allowed to 
move their resources into and out of specific activities, both internally and across the 
country’s borders, without restriction (Heritage Foundation, 2014).  
 
Following the liberalization of markets, developing economies establish regulatory agencies 
as mechanisms of market-support. Levi-Faur (2012) emphasizes that developmental state 
and the regulatory state represent an ongoing and largely continuous process of state and 
market building. As the regulatory state is claimed to promote equality or economic growth, 
it is possible to predict the joint expansion of the economy and the extent of regulatory 
governance. In industries that require long-term investment such as infrastructure 
industries, independent agencies offer the security of a stable investment climate and 
predictable rules (Levi- Faur, 2003). Thus, I expect that; 
 
H1. Countries with more open market economies delegate greater degrees of independence 
to their regulatory agencies. 
 
Diffusion research across American states demonstrates that rich states innovate faster 
(Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973), because they have a greater margin of spare resources making 
policy experimentation easier and the risk of failure less severe (Orenstein, 2003).  In 
addition, Gual (2005) observed that there is a high correlation between regulatory quality 
and GDP per capita. Jalilian et al. (2007) as well search for the impact of regulation on 
economic growth in developing economies and find out that there is a strong causal link 
between regulatory quality and economic growth. Through the reverse relationship, I expect 
that; 
 
H2. Regulatory independence increases with GDP per capita. 
 
2.2 Political System 
 
Various studies have shown that political features of countries are connected with the 
creation and survival of the economic institutions independent from politics. This research 
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identifies four of them: rule of law, level of democracy, form of government and veto 
players. 
 
2.2.1 Rule of Law 
 
Political scientists and economists often recommend that countries seeking economic 
development should embrace the principle of the rule of law (White, 2010).  The rule of 
law provides two basic protections against arbitrary or discriminatory government action. It 
provides that the rule applied to a particular case must be reasonably predictable. And it 
provides that the rule must be predictable without regard for the identity of the parties (Boies 
2006). 
 
As a tool of economic development through market improvement, regulatory agencies 
require autonomy from politics that rule of law could ensure. Under the rule of law, 
governments have less discretional authority to act arbitrarily or discriminatory. They face 
difficulties making up new decrees every time they wish to change an established 
practice, resulting in the preservation of formal independence of the authorities working 
autonomous from the government. It enables independent regulatory bodies to fulfill the 
function that the initial law gives them. 
 
Jordana and Ramió (2010) have demonstrated, on the basis of proxy measures related to 
turnover, that regulatory agencies in Latin America are, on average, less independent than 
their pairs in Western Europe. The gap between Latin American agencies and Western 
European ones is consistent with the difference in the rule of law between the two regions. 
Another study by Hanretty and Koop (2013) has shown that in countries where the rule of 
law is well established, the degree of actual independence of regulatory agencies is higher. 
Although they have put actual independence as in connection with the rule of law in a 
country, I expect that in countries where rule of law is well respected, the degree of formal 
independence of regulatory agencies will be higher due to less discretionary and arbitrary 
act of government against the formal mechanism. Drawing from these aspects, I hypothesize 
that;  
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H3. Countries with more firmly established rule of law have regulatory agencies with higher 
degrees of formal independence. 
 
2.2.2 Level of Democracy and Political Rights 
 
Various studies (see Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Kleinberg and Clark 2000; North 1990) have 
shown that liberalization4 is positively connected with democratization. As IRAs have been 
created and given independence during the waves of liberalization of the relevant markets in 
1990s and 2000s, it is possible to expect that the creation of IRAs increases with democracy 
levels. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) did not find clear support for the view that democracy 
as a regime and democratization as a process of change affects the process of the diffusion 
of regulatory authorities; however, they have suggested from Latin American model that 
more robust democracies create slightly fewer regulatory agencies. On the contrary, Vibert 
(2007) suggests that unelected bodies such as regulatory agencies strengthen with 
democracy. Democracies with less freedom display features of state paternalism or political 
clientelism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), thus create room for political interference towards 
independent decision makers such as courts, central banks or regulatory agencies. In 
democracies with more freedom, there are less tendencies to control the actions of 
presumably independent bodies. Level of democracy, therefore, increases the delegated 
authority to IRAs. Thus, I hypothesize that, 
 
H4a.  Free democracies are more likely to delegate more independence to regulatory agencies 
than partly free and not free democracies. 
 
Given that political institution variables often suggest a certain degree of political rights; 
scholars suggest that even autocratic regimes can have a satisfactory economic performance 
as long as some political rights are granted to society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Pereira, 2011).  It might also suggest that political institutions generate economic growth in 
authoritarian regimes by working as a substitute for democracy. In other words, autocracies 
                                                
4 Liberalization means elimination of state control over economic activities. It implies greater autonomy to the business 
enterprises in decision-making and removal of government interference.  
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can differentiate from each other with regards to political institutions. Countries with a wide 
range of political rights include free and fair elections in which political parties run in a 
competitive manner. Absence of political rights is prompt by severe government oppression 
and sometimes by lack of functioning central government (Freedom House, 2016). In a 
country where government shows oppressive features, no interference towards independent 
bodies is less expected. Therefore, I presume that; 
 
H4b. Countries with greater degrees of political rights tend to delegate more authority to 
agencies operating independent from the government. 
 
2.2.3 Form of Government and Veto Players 
 
Political scientists have long been interested in the potential political and economic 
consequences of electoral rules and form of government (Lijphart, 1992; Mainwaring & 
Shugart, 1997; Cheibub, 2007). Form of government affect economic growth through 
systematically influencing governments’ economic policies (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 
2003; Rodrik, 1996) and countries’ economic institutions (e.g. North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Persson, 2005). Parliamentarism and presidentialism each may demonstrate differing 
strengths and weaknesses along different policy dimensions (Weaver & Rockman, 1993). 
 
According to Jordana and Ramio (2010), strong legislatures of presidential regime, for 
example, protect delegation whereas in presidential regimes with weak legislatures 
institutional anchorages to delegation are almost on-existent. In parliamentary regimes, on 
the other hand, executives will be more favorable towards creating regulatory agencies 
accountable to the executive (Voigt and Salzberger 2002) and Executives in parliamentary 
systems often meet less resistance to attempted changes to agencies’ design, to the extent that 
they face fewer institutional veto players (Moe and Caldwell 1994). Yet none of these studies 
compare the levels of regulatory independence in parliamentary and presidential form of 
governments. 
 
Gerring et al. (2009: 23) finds that compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism is 
associated with better telecommunications infrastructure, lower import duties, greater trade 
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openness, better investment ratings, and higher levels of per capita GDP. Also, 
parliamentarism is strongly associated with good governance (2009: 24). As independent 
regulatory agencies are also associated with good governance and better market improvement 
due to its foreseen objectivity and impartiality (OECD, 2013), I expect that: 
 
H5a: Parliamentary regimes tend to delegate more authority to IRAs than presidential 
regimes. 
 
Jordana and Ramio (2010) argued that the more veto players present in a political regime, 
the more anchorage possibilities there will be for regulatory agencies to realize their formal 
independence. Gilardi (2002) found that in countries with more veto players, independent 
regulatory agencies are both less likely to be set up and to be less formally independent of 
governments. Some analysis of European countries has also shown that utilities liberalization 
increases the probability that an independent regulatory authority is established, but only in 
countries with few veto players (Gilardi 2005). On the other hand, the pattern seems different 
in Latin America, where independent regulatory agencies were more likely to be established 
in countries with many veto players (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005). Considering the 
development levels of the countries in these analysis, I hypothesize for middle-income 
economies that; 
 
H5b: Countries with more veto players delegate greater degrees of agency independence. 
 
2.3 Market Structure 
 
Promotion of competition in the infrastructure of capitalist economies coincided with the 
phenomenon of regulatory state (Levi-Faur, 2003) and eventually with the promotion of 
independent regulatory agencies in the regulation of infrastructure. The wave of 
infrastructure privatization5 has spread throughout the world in 1980s and 1990s, triggering 
the creation of new regulatory authorities to regulate the newly privatized infrastructure 
                                                
5 Privatization is the transfer of control of ownership of economic resources from the public sector to the private sector. It 
means a decline in the role of the public sector as there is a shift in the property rights from the state to private ownership.  
	
	
1
1 
monopolies. Prior to the telecommunications sector reforms, telecommunications services 
were largely provided under monopoly conditions, either by state entities or by private 
companies. Often the operator and regulatory body for telecommunications services was the 
government; therefore, no regulatory independence existed. Through the waves of 
liberalization, many independent agencies in utilities sectors have been established to fulfill 
the purpose of an “effective regulatory framework for the public utilities to be applicable to 
the private sector operators and to promote competition and regulate monopolies” (OECD, 
2013: 63). 
 
In most advanced countries, many previous monopolies are no longer so. In the developing 
world, however, most have remained as monopolies yet changed hands from public to 
private. As one of the missions of independent regulatory agencies, liberalization of 
monopolies and diffusion of independent regulatory agencies coincided in many countries. 
As a matter of fact, some of these agencies were established for that very purpose. Therefore, 
I expect that; 
 
H6: Regulatory independence is higher in countries with telecommunication sectors have 
been fully privatized. 
 
Next section introduces the operationalization of the measurement of regulatory agencies by 
introducing different methods and nodes; and selects the proper method of this research. 
  
 
2.4 Measurement of Regulatory Independence 
 
Although governments around the world delegated regulatory responsibilities to their 
independent regulatory agencies, it did not guarantee a single form of independence. 
Agencies may be independent from their governments and politicians to different degrees; 
therefore, the measurement of the independence of the regulatory agencies remains crucial 
for social science research. As this thesis explores the variations in the degrees of 
independence of regulatory agencies in different countries and time periods, the 
operationalization of the measurement of agency independence is vital to this research. 
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Political independence has been defined as “the ability to select policy objectives without 
influence from the government” in the literature of central bank independence (Alesina and 
Summers, 1993:55). Similarly, Hanretty and Koop (2012: 199), define political 
independence of regulatory agencies as “the degree to which day-to-day decisions of 
regulatory agencies are formed without the interference of politicians and/or consideration 
of politicians’ preferences”. Many authors, however, prefer to focus on empirical 
operationalization rather than definition to assess agency independence (see Gilardi 2002, 
Elgie and McMenamin 2005, Edwards and Waverman 2006, Trillas and Montaya 2007, 
Hanretty and Koop 2012). 
 
The literature makes an essential distinction between formal (or legal, or de jure) and actual 
(or de facto) independence of regulatory agencies (Gilardi and Maggetti, 2011). While formal 
independence points to rules of procedures, laws, decrees and statutes that create and sustain 
regulatory agencies, actual independence refers to how these rules are translated to everyday 
practices of the agencies. There is for sure a role for non-legal determinants of regulatory 
independence; however, this does not necessarily mean that formal independence is 
irrelevant to those determinants. Although some studies do not find formal independence6 as 
an important determinant in the actual independence (see Maggetti, 2007), many scholars 
trace actual independence from formal independence (Furlong, 1998; Hayo and Voigt, 
2007; Hanretty and Koop, 2013; Guidi 2015; Elgie and McMenamin 2005). This study, as 
well, study formal independence because (1) it observes variations of agency independence 
over time; and it is possible to track changes in formal independence by year through a formal 
change (e.g. new legislation) and (2) actual independence is more difficult to measure and 
compare quantitatively due to the fact that its observation is constrained. Examples of the 
measurement of actual independence observed the frequency of revolving doors phenomena, 
partisanship of nominations, internal organization and so on (see Maggetti, 2007; Hanretty 
and Koop, 2013). However, observation of these features in large number of countries and 
sectors are beyond the capabilities and goals of this study. 
 
                                                
6 Using Gilardi (2002) index. 
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Gilardi (2002:880) uses the independence indices developed for central banks (see, for 
example, Grilli, 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Cukierman and Webb, 1995) by making some 
adaptations. His analysis acknowledges the distinction between formal and informal 
independence, but proclaims “understanding the institutional design of regulatory agencies 
requires that the formal aspects of independence are the only ones that policy makers can 
directly influence”. Gilardi, therefore, focuses on formal independence and divides it into 
five dimensions: (1) status of the director of the agency, (2) status of the board of directors, 
(3) relationship with the government and legislative, (4) financial and organizational 
autonomy and (5) regulatory competencies. 
 
Montaya and Trillas (2007) apply several alternative methods previously used in the 
literature to measure the degree of regulatory independence for telecommunications 
regulatory agencies. The authors construct independence measure that combine legal and 
practice issues, borrowing from the methodology used in the central bank independence 
literature. For example, the legal indices used thus far computed the prescribed number of 
years that the head of agency was allowed to stay in office, but authors correct this legal 
prescription with the actual time period that the regulator is in office (2007:32). 
 
Table 1 below summarizes a number of indices from the literature that measures formal 
independence of regulatory agencies. 
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Table 1: Measurement of Independence of Regulatory Agencies 
 
Referee Agency 
independence 
Nodes Aggregation Method 
Gilardi (2002) From politicians Agency head; agency board; 
relationship with government 
and parliament; financial, 
organizational autonomy; 
exclusive competence 
Mean of node scores 
(selected method for 
this thesis) 
Elgie and 
McMenamin 
(2005) 
From politicians Agency head; agency board; 
regulatory competencies 
Mean of appointments 
node scores, plus 
competencies node 
score, divided by two 
Edwards and 
Waverman 
(2006) 
From 
government 
Multi-sectoral, multi-member 
agency; exclusive competence; 
power over interconnect rates 
Mean of item scores 
Trillas and 
Montaya (2007) 
From politicians Political vulnerability; the 
turnover rate; practical 
independence 
Mean of item scores 
Hanretty and 
Koop (2012) 
From politicians Agency head; agency board; 
internal organization; 
personnel 
Latent trait model 
 
 
As this research attempts to measure the degree of formal independence of regulatory 
agencies in middle income economies, the relevant literature on the methods of measurement 
are presented in this section. The relevant literature shows that authors who address and 
analyze formal independence mostly use the index of Gilardi (2002) whose features are 
borrowed from Cukierman et al.’s (1992) central bank independence index. This thesis 
likewise use the index developed by Gilardi to measure formal independence of regulatory 
agencies. 
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Chapter 3. 
Research Design: Data, Method and Models 
 
 
 
The goal in this analysis is to understand whether economic freedom, level of political rights, 
level of democracy, form of government, state ownership in the market, rule of law, number 
of veto players and GDP per capita (independent variables) affect the independence of 
regulatory agencies (dependent variable). The source of the data presented in this research is 
a database of regulatory agencies observed at country-sector categories. The database 
comprises of telecommunications sector and countries that were middle-income when their 
telecommunications regulatory agency was established. 
 
Graph 1 displays the level of regulatory independence by countries in the datasets on a world 
map by coloring higher levels of independence with darker colors whilst less independence 
with lighter ones. 
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Graph 1: Agency Independence across Countries 
 
 
 
Source: My own calculation 
 
Low-income and middle-income economies are collectively referred to as developing 
economies but this research selects only middle-income economies to observe regulatory 
independence in the developing world7. Middle-income countries’ GDP per capita varies 
from 1,046 to 12,735 US dollars which is a broad range to show the impact of income level 
on agency independence (WDI, 2016). In addition, ENP-South countries that are examined 
in the second part of the empirical research belong to middle-income economies. 
 
Expecting to find some variation in the world of regulatory agencies, this thesis searches for 
possible explanatory basis underlying the differences. As the group of middle income 
provides a sample with various development levels, political systems and market traditions 
from different regions of the world, the results will be representative both for the countries 
of research and other developing economies of the world. 
 
                                                
7 Middle income economies represent 77% of the developing economies. 
	
1
7 
Limited sample size is an important limitation of this research. Collecting data for all 
countries and in all different languages was not feasible, therefore this thesis relies on data 
that is collected by ITU ICT Eye Regulatory Information8. Although the addition of more 
middle-income economies would enrich the analysis and results of this research, it only adds 
countries whose telecommunications agencies do not lack values regarding the indicators of 
the independence index. That is why, other middle income economies could not be added to 
the research. The sample includes countries that were middle income when their regulatory 
agencies were established. Nine of them have later became high income countries: Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia9. These countries 
have gone through massive market liberalization recently and committed to reform their 
regulatory framework in line with the best-perceived practice as other middle-income 
countries of the research. 
 
In total, this thesis has collected data for telecommunications sectors of 36 countries. It has 
gathered data on formal independence for a sample of 36 middle-income countries10 through 
ITU ICT Eye Regulatory Information (2016) which consists of questionnaires sent to 
regulatory agencies; and double-checked that information by other available sources such as 
laws, decrees, ordinances and statutes. The dependent variable of the analysis is thus the 
independence of regulatory agencies in a given country and agency. To measure the degree 
of independence, an independence index is used to weight different aspects of regulatory 
independence to produce one single value for every agency (see Gilardi 2002; Cukierman et 
al. 1992; see Appendix A for the index and its composites). 
 
A multivariate linear regression analysis is pursued to understand the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables of this study since (a) the model estimates with multi 
explanatory variables, (b) the dependent variable is quantitative and continuous, and (c) the 
relationship is in a linear trend. 
 
                                                
8 Available at http://www.itu.int/net4/itu-d/icteye/AdvancedDataSearch.aspx 
9	 These countries were middle income economies when their telecom regulators were formed except for Russia and 
Slovakia. They are still added to the research to have a complete set of transition economies.	
10 When their telecommunications regulatory agencies were created. 
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The independent variables are linked to the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. 
Although endogeneity might appear as a problem due to a loop of causality between the 
independent and dependent variables of the model, it is justified because the hypotheses are 
developed to find out the correlation rather than the causation between the dependent and 
independent variables. First variable is level of political rights and is collected from Freedom 
House Freedom in the World: Political Rights (2015) measurement index as 1 being most 
free and 7 being least free in terms of political rights11.  Freedom House Category of 
Democracy 2014 has been added in Model 1 to see the impact of the level of democracy with 
three categories: not free, partly free and free. 
 
Second variable is investment freedom, and its data has been collected from Heritage 2015 
Index of Economic Freedom: Investment Freedom12  database. Third variable is remaining 
state ownership13 in main fixed operator (%). The data on remaining state ownership is 
collected from ITU ICT Eye Regulatory Information (2015)14. GDPs per capita in US dollars 
is achieved through World Bank (2015). The data on the fifth variable, rule of law, has been 
attained through World Governance Index (2014) rule of law measurement.  
 
Number of veto players has been achieved through the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) 2012. The data on the categorical independent variable, form of government, has also 
been transferred from DPI 2012 and has three categories: parliamentary, presidential and 
mixed system. 
 
Table 2 portrays the descriptive statistics to summarize the sample of this research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 The political rights questions were grouped into three subcategories in their measurement: Electoral Process (3 questions), 
Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). 
12 Available at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
13 Represents market liberalization. 
14	Available at http://www.itu.int/net4/itu-d/icteye/AdvancedDataSearch.aspx 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean St. 
Deviation 
Regulatory 
Independence 
36 5.00 95.00 63.81 26.48 
Investment 
Freedom 
36 0 90.00 60.28 19.99 
Remaining state 
ownership 
36 0 100 51.81 37.39 
Rule of law 36 -1.3600 1.1600 -0.0475 0.621 
GDP per capita 
(US dollars) 
36 1.000 24.000 8.222 5.643 
Political rights 36 1.000 7.000 3.333 2.028 
Veto Players 36 1.000 3.000 2.917 1.662 
 
 
The null hypotheses in this research are; 
H01: The levels of investment freedom have no effect on the independence of regulatory 
agencies. 
H02: GDP per capita has no effect on the independence of regulatory agencies. 
H03: Rule of law has no impact on the regulatory independence. 
H04a: Category of democracy, whether free, partly free or not free have no effect on the 
independence of regulatory agencies. 
H04b: Level of granted political rights have no effect on the independence of regulatory 
agencies. 
H05a: Form of government, whether presidential, parliamentary or mixed, has no effect on 
the regulatory independence. 
H05b: Numbers of veto players have no impact on the independence of regulatory agencies. 
H06: Remaining state ownership has no effect on the independence of regulatory agencies. 
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The alternative hypotheses are; 
H1. Countries with more open market economies (through investment freedom) delegate 
greater degrees of autonomy to their IRAs. 
H2. As GDP per capita increases, the level of regulatory independence increases. 
H3. Agency independence increases when rule of law is better established in a country. 
H4a. Countries with greater degrees of freedom in political rights delegate more authority to 
IRAs. 
H4b. Regulatory independence increases with level of democracy. 
H5a. Parliamentary regimes are more prone to incorporate autonomous agencies operating 
independent from the government than presidential regimes. 
H5b. Countries with more veto players delegate more authority to IRAs. 
H6. Greater state ownership in the market decreases the degrees of regulatory independence. 
 
For 90% level of significance, alpha is determined as 0.1 (1-0.90=0.1). 
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Chapter 4. 
Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
4.1 Analysis 
 
Before turning to the multivariate analysis, a bivariate breakdown of the relationship between 
independent variables and agency independence is presented in Graph 2.  The variables on 
the horizontal x-axis is the independent (predictor) variable, and the variable on the vertical 
y-axis is the dependent (response) variable. Each point in the plot is plotted as a pair. Since 
it is a small number of observations, amount of scatterness is weak.  
 
The first plot shows that as freedom of investment increases, regulatory independence 
increases. Therefore, these two variables are positively correlated. The second plot 
demonstrates that there is a negative correlation between the independence and state 
ownership. The third plot displays a negative correlation between independence of regulatory 
agencies and decreasing political rights, meaning that as the freedom in political rights 
increases, regulatory independence improves. Rule of law also has a positive correlation with 
regulatory independence level whereas no linear relationship is observed with GDP per capita 
of countries and number of veto players. 
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Graph 2: Plots 
 
 
 
Graph 3 reveals the standardized residuals of the five quantitative independent variables via 
the dependent variable. 
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Graph 3: Standardized Residuals 
 
 
 
Considering the standardized residuals, rule of law and GDP per capita does not show a clear 
regression line with the level of agency independence. 
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The analysis observes form of government and veto players separately to avoid a correlation 
between the two independent variables. The same concern applies for political rights and 
level of democracy variables and therefore they are included in different models. 
 
The result of the models is shown in Table 3. The equation of these models are; 
 
y1= 0.26417x1 – 0.20196x2 – 0.99184x3 – 0.9.86612x4 + 0.34198x5 + 4.08718x6 + 67.83554 
y2= 0.31422!"-0.20022!#-8.69316!$-19.65496!%+1.38359!&-5.76627!'+88.41320 
y3 =0.45085!"-0.14332!#+0.14621!$+0.613551!%-6.07671!&+0.48632!'+ 61.71851 
 
Note that variables which increase formal independence should have a positive sign whereas 
variables that decrease regulatory independence should have a negative sign. 
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Table 3: Regression Results15 
Observations                                 36                              36                           36 
Multiple R-squared                 0.7565                          0.7796                     0.7393 
Adjusted R-squared                0.6843                          0.7245                     0.6853 
Residual standard error        13.9 on 28 degrees of freedom 
                                                
15 Significance at 0.1 level. 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept 67.83554 **  
(0.00416) 
88.41320 ***  
(0.000154) 
61.71851 *** 
(0.000458) 
Investment freedom 0.26417  
(0.16721) 
0.31422 .  
(0.070853) 
0.45085 * 
(0.011347) 
State ownership -0.20196 * 
(0.02613) 
-0.20022 *  
(0.017020) 
-0.14332 . 
(0.088631) 
Regime type 2 
(Parliamentary) 
-0.99184  
(0.93766) 
-8.69316 
(0.440947) 
 
Regime type 3 
(Presidential) 
-9.86612  
(0.45055) 
-19.65496 .  
(0.089847) 
 
GDP per capita 0.34198 
(0.57230) 
-0.06110 
(0.906737) 
0.14621 
(0.795065) 
Rule of Law 4.08718 
(0.48413) 
1.38359 
(0.793111) 
0.61351 
(0.912713) 
Decreasing Political 
Rights 
 -5.76627 ***  
(0.000634) 
-6.07671 ** 
(0.001011) 
Democracy Category 
2 (Not Free) 
-25.96667 ** 
(0.00447) 
  
Democracy Category 
3 (Partly Free) 
-3.63159 
(0.63389) 
  
Veto Players   0.48632 
(0.802055) 
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This sample, thus, provides enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses H01, H04a, H04b 
and H05a and H06, but not the null hypothesis H02, H03 and H05b. Multiple R-
squared=0.7796 in Model 2 means that %77.96 of the variability is explained by the model. 
Therefore, Model 2 has the most explanatory power among others. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results and Discussion 
 
Level of Economic Development (GDP per capita) 
Gdp per capita as an indicator of economic development level is insufficient in explaining 
the levels of agency independence. It did not present a positive or negative impact on the 
agency independence in this sample, failing to accept the hypothesis (H4). Jordana and 
Ramió (2010) have demonstrated that developing economies in general are less independent 
than their pairs in advanced economies. Gual (2005) and Jalilian et al. (2007) also observed 
that there is a high correlation between regulatory quality and GDP per capita. The results of 
the statistical analysis of this thesis, however, show that level of economic development 
cannot explain the delegation of authority to IRAs. 
 
The countries with the highest GDP per capita in the sample are Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Lebanon and 
Turkey. Among those, Russia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia present very low rates of agency 
independence. In addition, one of the countries from the sample with a very low GDP per 
capita rate, Georgia, has granted greater independence to its telecommunications regulatory 
agency, GNCC, than many countries with higher levels of gross domestic product per capita. 
 
Form of Government 
The results show that compared to mixed and parliamentary regimes, countries with 
presidential regimes in developing economies delegate less authority to IRAs. Presidential 
form of government displays a negative association with 19.65 decrease in agency 
independence (H5) when compared to mixed and parliamentary form. As Gerring et. al 
(2009) spotted that presidentialism demonstrates lower telecommunications infrastructure 
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and lower investment ratings, it also demonstrates lower levels of regulatory independence 
for a sample of middle income economies. 
 
Graph 4 below reveals distribution of the levels of independence by the form of government. 
 
Graph 4: Agency Independence and Form of Government 
 
1: mixed government 
2: parliamentary government 
3: presidential government 
 
Graph 4 demonstrates that presidential form of government has the most variation in itself in 
terms of agency independence. Parliamentary regimes incorporate autonomous agencies 
operating independent from the government more than presidential regimes. Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have presidentialism as their form of 
government and they have lowest formal agency independence scores in the sample. It is, 
however, important to note that presidentialism solely cannot explain the behavior. Other 
presidential regimes from the sample, for instance, as Lithuania (with 95 out of 100, 100 
being the full independence), Georgia (with 90), Poland (with 80) and Moldova (with 80) 
showed a rather higher rates of agency independence. 
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Number of Veto Players 
The results fail to confirm hypothesis H5b that countries with more veto players grant more 
independence regulatory agencies. In fact, the results show no negative or positive 
statistically significant impact of the number of veto players on regulatory independence. 
 
In the literature, scholars studying advanced economies suggested that less veto players 
brings more independence to IRAs (Gilardi 2002) whereas other scholars focusing on Latin 
American countries observed the opposite (Jordana and Ramio, 2010). This thesis can agree 
with neither; looking at the results that number of veto players have no impact on regulatory 
independence in middle-income economies. 
 
Political Rights and Democracy 
The results of the empirical analysis confirm the hypothesis (H2) that freedom in political 
rights adds considerable explanatory power to the analysis of IRA autonomy. Political rights 
in the country turned out to be the most significant predictor of formal independence with 
0.000634 significance in the model. As the score on political rights (due to electoral process, 
political pluralism and functioning government) decreases one unit, the level of regulatory 
independence decreases by 5.76627 units. Where countries grant more freedom in political 
rights, there is a higher agency independence. Absence of political rights is prompt by severe 
government oppression and sometimes by lack of functioning central government, thus 
observably leading to less agency independence. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Egypt, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan appear to have the least agency independence scores from the 
sample and they have been given the least political rights freedom ratings although Egypt 
and Kazakhstan are slightly better (with 6 out of 7, 7 being the least free). Obviously, the 
impact of other variables must also be considered when looking at single countries.  
 
Confirming the statistical significance of political rights freedom, state of freedom in 
democracy -whether free, partly free or not free- was substantial in the expected direction in 
Model 1 with 0.00447 significance. Lower levels of freedom in democracy decreases 
regulatory independence by 25.96 units when compared to democracies with more freedom. 
Partly free democracies, on the other hand, compared to free ones, decreased regulatory 
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independence by 3.63159 units although it did not come out to be significant in the model. 
Democracies with less freedom display features of state paternalism or political clientelism 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004) more than free democracies. Therefore, IRAs are relatively more 
prevalent in countries with greater level of freedom due to delegation of power without 
political interference. 
 
The extant literature has not observed the relationship between freedom in political rights in 
a country and regulatory independence. However, Maggetti (2010:3) has drawn attention to 
the fact that independent regulatory agencies are considered institutions as protectors of pre-
established “basic principles” from the risk of an arbitrary use of power by political decision 
makers. In countries where freedom in political rights is restricted, thus, arbitrary use of 
power is more expected, allowing for interference to regulatory decisions as well. 
 
State Ownership 
Market structure variable (H3) –remaining state ownership in the fixed line operator- was 
significant in the expected direction with 0.017020 significance. One percent increase in 
remaining state ownership decreases regulatory independence by 0.20022 units. Privatization 
is the transfer of control of ownership of economic resources from the public sector to private 
sector. State ownership in the market therefore demonstrates that the widespread trend of 
privatization in the infrastructure industries have not yet been adopted or completed. As Levi-
Faur (2005) observed, the process of privatization and the diffusion of regulatory authorities 
around the world have coincided in the late 1990s and 2000s. Yet, after 2000, the diffusion 
pace of regulatory agencies has passed the pace of privatization. Although Levi-Faur spotted 
this trend in terms of an existence of separate regulators, the trend is confirmed in the level 
of agency independence as well. Countries whose regulators have lower levels of 
independence show higher levels of state ownership in the fixed line operator. Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Serbia, Lebanon and Moldova are the countries whose fixed operators 
are still state-owned. 
 
Moldovan telecommunications agency, ANRCETI, stands as an interesting case due to its 
high levels of agency independence even though the telecommunications market did not 
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complete the liberalization process. Liberalization means elimination of state control over 
economic activities. Even though the market entered into liberalization phase in 2004, the 
incumbent operator, Moldtelecom, still retains a large market share (97.0%). Moldtelecom 
was a state company but in 1999, it was reorganized and became a joint-stock company with 
the state being the unique stockholder16. ANRCETI’s high levels of formal independence is 
also important in the sense that it was founded on 2008 after the reorganization of former 
regulatory agency, ANRTI, which was the first regulatory telecommunications authority in 
the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, ANRCETI is acknowledged as determined to promote 
liberalization policies and fair competition (ITU, 2012). 
 
Investment Freedom 
 I hypothesized that (H1) countries with more open market economies (through investment 
freedom) grant greater degrees of independence to their regulatory agencies. Economic 
freedom variable- investment freedom- shows a positive correlation with the agency 
independence, confirming this hypothesis (with 0.07 significance). Most countries have a 
variety of restrictions on investment. Some have different rules for foreign and domestic 
investment, some restrict access to foreign exchange and in some, certain industries are close 
to foreign investment (Heritage Foundation, 2015). It, expectedly, correlates with agency 
independence as an objective of the IRAs is to promote competition. If a country behaves in 
a way to restrict foreign or domestic investment in telecommunications industry, it tends to 
delegate less autonomy to its telecommunications regulatory agency due to diminishing 
competences of the agency when there is less competition and investment. 
 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia and Georgia are the countries with the highest levels of 
investment freedom. Except Armenia, these are also the countries with highly independent 
agencies. Armenian telecom regulator, PSRC, has relatively low levels of agency 
independence, compared to aforementioned four other countries with high levels of 
investment freedom. The main legal basis for telecommunications regulation in Armenia is 
the Law on Electronic Communications, adopted in 2005. PSRC’s autonomy has been 
                                                
16Available at http://www.moldtelecom.md/common/PDF/PDF_content/Rapoarte_Anuale/Raport_anual_2008_ru.pdf 
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affected by the ambiguous legislation, which did not set clear mechanisms for funding and 
budget (EBRD, 2012). Its regulatory independence is therefore low compared to its pairs. 
 
Investment freedom brings further opportunities of competition to the respective market, 
telecommunications in our case. Countries that are determined to bring further investment 
freedom delegate more autonomy to IRAs. 
 
Rule of Law 
Although rule of law has been displayed as positively correlated with agency independence 
(see Graph 1), it did not reveal a significant explanatory power in the model, when interacted 
with other variables (H6). Studies of agency independence in advanced economies 
acknowledged that rule of law is a significant determinant of agency independence (see 
Hanretty and Koop, 2013). When observed for middle-income economies, however, it did 
not demonstrate a statistical significance in explaining regulatory independence. Correlation 
between rule of law and political rights does not reveal a statistically significance, eliminating 
the possibility of an interaction between two variables. In fact, it does not correlate highly 
with any of the independent variables. In middle-income economies, therefore, freedom in 
political rights explains level of agency independence more than the measure of rule of law. 
 
 
All in all, the results of the statistical analysis have shown that countries with greater levels 
of regulatory independence are positively associated with the degree to which countries 
grant freedom in political rights and investment. The level of democracy also increases the 
degrees of independence. The effect of state ownership in the market is consistent with the 
findings of the previous studies on advanced economies (see Levi-Faur, 2005). Countries 
whose telecommunications markets are dominated by state ownership are less prone to 
incorporate greater degrees of regulatory independence. Further, compared to mixed and 
parliamentary regimes, countries with presidential regimes in developing economies 
delegate less authority to IRAs. Contrary to findings of the studies on advanced economies, 
income level, rule of law and the number of veto players do not show a statistically 
significant impact on regulatory independence. 
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Chapter 5. 
Cross- Temporal Variation in Regulatory Independence 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As far as independence is concerned, although scholars and international institutions promote 
the establishment of independent regulators, there is less discussion of whether independence 
is sustainable or how to make it sustainable. The previous chapter has shown that greater 
levels of agency independence depend on the market structure and the political and economic 
setting of each country. Political and economic setting, however, do change in time and may 
affect the mechanisms of formal independence. Even though cross-national examination 
contributes to the literature by exhibiting the patterns of regulatory independence, it cannot 
explain why regulatory independence shrinks over time in some countries even though an 
initial mandate has invested in its sustainability. 
 
The legal and regulatory framework of telecommunications market has experienced 
significant changes after the midst of 1990s due to rapid development of digital technologies 
and internet. Technological developments have influenced the traditional 
telecommunications markets by replacing the state owned monopolized services with 
competitive supply of fixed and mobile services. The pace of liberalization at which the 
telecommunications markets have been transformed has varied across countries. Each 
country has made a progress in the transition from monopolistic to competitive markets 
adopting new legal and regulatory frameworks. Many of them have created independent 
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regulators in this market to catch up with complex technical and technological developments 
and to deal with increasing competition in the market. The EU in the ENP countries has 
pushed for regulatory reform through ENP Association Agreements and series of action 
plans, for them to apply the EU regulatory framework. 
 
Guidi (2015), looking at all the EU member states, observes that there has been a general 
increase in formal independence over time and that cross-country variation has been 
decreasing. In other countries, however, a weakening of the formal independence has been 
observed. Among those, many have committed to internationally perceived-best practices of 
agency independence, following mainly the EU regulatory framework and WTO principles. 
Why, then, have some governments chosen to undermine regulatory independence over time 
even though they have previously invested in the establishment of these independent 
agencies? This chapter explores the mechanisms of change in formal independence and its 
economic and political determinants. It explains briefly why the initial functional approach 
remains insufficient in explaining the behavior of governments which undermine formal 
independence. It then discusses aspects of change in formal independence by generating a 
theoretical foundation and presents examples from several countries and elaborates the 
methodology, case selection and data collection processes. 
 
After this discussion, the chapter qualitatively explores cross-temporal change in agency 
independence by combining formal and informal aspects of it in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia. It looks into economic, political and market-based challenges faced in those 
countries and sees how it relates to formal independence mechanisms case by case. After, it 
discusses and compares the formal change in regulatory independence of four countries by 
focusing on the variation in explanatory factors. Chapter 6 brings the examination of 
quantitative cross-national and qualitative cross-temporal regulatory independence 
scholarship together to comprehensively understand the reasons behind variation, before 
concluding. 
 
Findings of this chapter reveal that regulatory independence cannot be preserved as once and 
for all. Governments may undermine not only de facto, but also formal independence of 
agencies over time through means of budget control, dispossession of competences and 
	
3
4 
autonomy loss in decision making. Evidence from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia suggests 
political uncertainties have led these countries’ governments to take control of the market 
and its regulation by undermining agency independence both in de facto and de jure terms. 
Jordan presents a different case than the other three countries because despite of the fact that 
the country has gone through political challenges, Jordan’s economy, telecommunications 
market and the TRC (its telecoms regulator) have been resilient. 
 
 
5.2 Delegation of Authority and Change in Independence 
 
This section relates the discussion of delegation of authority to the change in regulatory 
independence over time and evaluates its insights. 
While there are multiple causes for regulatory delegation by the government to IRAs, one of 
the most prevalent theoretical explanations appear to be the need to establish credible policy 
regimes by limiting political interference in regulatory matters (Gilardi, 2002; Majone, 1996, 
1997). Scholars who have employed this approach presumed that governments would not 
undermine the independence of regulatory agencies, because they will depend on fire 
alarms17 and other oversight mechanisms. This point of view, however, does not provide 
insights regarding a formal change in legislation, or appointment and budget control 
mechanisms over time, resulting in a decrease in agency independence. Politicians who do 
not agree with regulatory decisions of an independent agency can in reality pass a law to 
make the agency less independent, breaking the initial delegation. McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast (1989) have speculated that politicians cannot depend on a new legislation to 
undermine agency autonomy because that behavior damages the original coalition, i.e. the 
coalition that established the initial directive; meaning that there will be no majority to pass 
a law projected to correct agency behavior. They conclude, therefore, that threats of new 
legislation are useless. Their conclusion, nevertheless, does not account for the fact that in 
some countries, the independence of the regulatory agencies is undermined over time due to 
new legislation and newly enforced control mechanisms such as the initiation of state funded 
                                                
17	Affected third parties such as interest groups and media monitor the agency and ask for political action when necessary 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998).	
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agency budgets or the dispossession of some of the tasks of the agency. 
In the literature, it has been demonstrated that in areas in which the need for credible policy 
arrangements are particularly evident (such as utilities regulation), formal agency 
independence is higher (Gilardi, 2008). In some countries, however, regulatory agencies have 
been created through political processes and under political considerations (Moe, 1990). 
Political uncertainty, for example, may give incentives to politicians to isolate policies by 
delegating them to formally independent agencies (Gilardi,2005, 2008; Wonka and 
Rittberger, 2010). At the same time, however, politicians may try to direct policies to what 
they perceive as the best for political salience through several control mechanisms, and these 
may eventually undermine the independence of those regulatory agencies. During the period 
of widespread diffusion of regulatory agencies, many countries have adapted them to catch 
up with global trends in the market and in public governance. Some governments have 
embraced the concept of formal agency independence much less enthusiastically than others. 
(Bianculli et al., 2013). This is one of the reasons why a diversion from the formal agency 
independence model has taken place over time. 
 
The effect of time has been referred to as progressive and positive in the literature due to the 
“learning effect” (Baudrier, 2001). Some countries, of course, have developed regulatory 
independence further over time, learning from their own and other countries’ experiences. 
Other countries, however, did not follow a linear or positive path in the degree of regulatory 
independence. Many regulatory agencies in middle income countries, across time, have either 
lost or gained autonomy from their affiliated ministry, incumbent legislature and elected 
politicians. Formal independence mechanisms have been changed by governments. This 
temporal change has occurred due to organizational, political and economic experiences. 
Although functional explanations have been excellent in elucidating the delegation of 
authority in the first place, it appears inadequate in understanding these temporal 
differentiations. This is why cross-temporal differences in regulatory independence need 
further scholarly examination considering that some countries have undermined regulatory 
independence over time, disregarding their initial efforts to form them. 
The next section discusses aspects of formal independence by generating a theoretical 
foundation and presents examples from several countries. 
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5.3 Autonomy and Government Control 
The reform of the information and communication technology sector has led to major 
changes at the regulatory and institutional levels. One of the most striking changes has 
occurred through the rise of the telecommunications regulatory agencies operating separately 
from affiliated ministries. 
Thatcher (2002) defined that for an agency to be an IRA, it must keep its own powers and 
responsibilities given under public law; must be organizationally separate from ministries 
and must neither be elected nor managed by elected officials. Gilardi identifies agencies that 
enjoy high independence more specifically. They are typically characterized by a long term 
of office for the heads and board members and an appointment procedure in which technical 
skills are highlighted. Dismissal procedures of the agencies with high independence are 
designed so as to make dismissal due to political reasons almost impossible (2001:9). 
Moreover, according to Gilardi (2001), responsibilities to government and parliament such 
as an annual report makes agencies more independent. Lastly, having a budget by fees levied 
on the regulated industry rather than a state fund makes agencies freer in terms of the 
allocation of the staff and tasks. 
Considering these principles of formal independence, many agencies, if not all, have been 
either established following these principles from the very beginning or accomplished them 
over time. There have been some agencies, however, which have lost their autonomy from 
affiliated ministries or incumbent legislation in time mainly through three mechanisms: (1) 
control in decision making, (2) budget control and (3) bereaving competences. These three 
mechanisms are examined below with theoretical foundation and supported with empirical 
examples from several countries. 
 
One of the indicators of a loss of autonomy appeared to be the autonomy in decision making. 
A control mechanism that is widely emphasized in the literature is the power of political 
principals to appoint the agencies' head and management board members (Weingast and 
Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1984; Huber and Shipan, 2000). Through mechanisms of 
appointment and dismissal of the head and board of the regulatory body, autonomy in 
decision making might be captured by political figures in the government. Examples of 
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formal autonomy loss in decision making have been observed in Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia, although Morocco was regained autonomy later on18 (ITU ICT Eye, 2015).  
 
Another indicator of autonomy loss is the control over budgets as an effective means of 
limiting agencies' discretion (Moe 1987; Huber and Shipan 2000). Budgets can be used as 
rewards and sanctions and thus structure the agencies' incentives. Countries whose 
governments have controlled the regulatory budget of the telecoms regulator for some time 
include Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Namibia, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa 
and Ukraine. The budget of the regulatory authority is still financed by a state-fund in 
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Lebanon, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa and Ukraine19. 
 
Last but not the least, reducing and distributing the competences that have been once 
delegated to the agencies is a way to shrink regulatory independence. Examples of this can 
be seen in Poland, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia after 2012. Yet other countries’ 
telecommunications regulators have been assigned with further competences over time (in 
Armenia, Egypt, Malaysia, Moldova and Namibia). 
 
Why, then, have some governments undermined formal independence over time even though 
there had been times when their agencies were regarded as more independent? Were political 
instabilities and economic crisis relevant in the downshift of formal independence? This 
research aims at understanding answers to these matters by focusing on the 
telecommunications regulatory agencies of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18	These cases are examined in detail in the case study section. 
19 Among 36 countries in the Chapter 3. 
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5.4 Data Collection and Case Selection 
 
This chapter examines cross-temporal change in agency independence combining formal and 
informal aspects of independence. It brings formal independence data from ITU ICT Eye 
together with de facto independence data from European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
Progress Reports. It then explores the impact of political uncertainty, economic instability 
and commitment to EU regulatory directive on agency independence. It collects data on 
formal agency independence from 2006 to 2015 from ITU ICT Eye Regulatory Information 
Data Search for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia. It gathers data on de facto regulatory 
practices in these four countries from ENP Progress Reports from 2006 to 2015. 
 
This research looks into eight indicators to represent formal agency independence: (1) the 
regulator’s autonomy in decision making, (2) the regulator’s enforcement power, (3) the 
authority approving regulatory decisions, (4) the authority approving the budget of the 
regulator, (5) the reporting requirements of the regulator, (6) the sanctions and penalties 
imposed by the regulator, (7) the source of the budget and percentage financed from each 
source and (8) ultimate authority able to overturn regulatory decisions. ITU ICT Eye has 
started collecting information on all of these eight indicators in 2006. Therefore, the 
regulatory independence data has been collected for ten years from 2006 to 2015. 
 
Among other developing economies from the sample of the previous chapter, this chapter 
chooses to examine cross-temporal independence in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Three main criteria stand behind the selection of these four countries: (1) they are all ENP-
South countries who have initiated an Action Plan with the EU, (2) they are all middle income 
economies, and (3) at least ten years have passed since their separate telecommunications 
regulatory agencies have been created. These three criteria are explained in detail below. 
 
First of all, these four countries are ENP-South countries. They have signed an Association 
Agreement with the EU under the ENP (ENP, 2015). The EU offers financial assistance to 
these countries as long as they meet the conditions of government reform, economic reform 
and other issues approximating a positive transformation. One of the areas about which the 
EU expects reform and makes financial support is electronic communication policy and 
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regulation. To that end, IRAs in the telecommunications are promoted to achieve a 
comprehensive regulatory framework and politically independent regulation (ENP, 2015). 
Therefore, all four countries have shown an official commitment (signing an Association 
Agreement) to reform telecommunications sector in line with what is perceived as the best 
practice in the EU.  
 
Secondly, all four countries’ telecommunications IRAs were created at least ten years ago; 
which makes it possible to examine the cross-temporal formal change in the agency 
independence. The year of the separate IRA creation for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia 
are respectively 2003, 1995, 1997, and 2001. As this research starts the examination from 
2006, all four countries’ agencies, by then, set up their formal mechanisms to observe 
systematic changes in the agency independence and delegation of authority to them are 
complete. 
 
Although it is an ENP-South country who has signed an Action Plan with the EU, I do not 
include Lebanon and its telecom agency in this research because it was separately created in 
2007 and this research examines independence from the year 2006 on.  
 
The third reason for the case selection is the income levels. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia have similar levels of economic development, measured by income per capita. Their 
current GDP per capita’s (PPP) for 2015 are respectively $10,891, $10.880, $7,821 and 
$11,397 (WDI, 2016). Although Israel and Palestine have also signed an Association 
Agreement and initiated Action Plans with the EU, the income level of Israel ($35,431) 
stands too high, whereas Palestine’s ($5,009) is too low compared to the other four countries. 
The reason to control for the per capita GDP is to show cross-temporal change at similar 
economic growth levels. 
 
In the next section, four countries’ (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) regulatory bodies 
are examined in detail to understand the dynamics behind the cross-temporal change in 
agency independence. The previous chapter has measured agency independence in 2014 for 
36 countries. Considering that political rights and investment freedom were 
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explaining regulatory independence, the same variables are employed here to see if they are 
sufficient in explaining the change in the formal independence over time. 
 
Table 4 below shows the measured independence levels of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia, the year that these levels have changed and the aspect of the change. 
 
Table 4: Change in Independence 
 
Country Year of Formal 
Change in 
Independence 
Which aspect of 
independence has 
changed? 
Formal 
Independence in 
2014 (over 1) 
Egypt 
(NTRA) 
2013 Autonomy in decision 
making 
0.2 
Jordan 
(TRC) 
2008 Budget control 0.6 
Morocco 
(ANRT) 
2006, 2008 Autonomy in decision 
making, Competences 
0.6 
Tunisia 
(INT) 
2011, 2012 Autonomy in decision 
making, Competences 
0.5 
Source: ITU ICT Eye (2016) 
 
 
 
5.5 Egypt 
 
The National Telecom Regulatory Authority (NTRA) of Egypt was established in accordance 
with the provisions of Telecom Regulation Law No. 10/ 2003 as the national authority 
competent to regulate and administer the telecommunications sector. According to ITU ICT 
Eye (2016), from 2006 to 2012, NTRA has protected its formal autonomy in decision making. 
By 2013, however, the agency had lost its decision making autonomy formally and proceeded 
as such during 2014 and 2015. 
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In 2008, an ENP Progress Report acknowledged that Egypt will strengthen the capacity of 
the NTRA through a twinning project with a regulator from an EU Member State in order to 
strengthen the TRC’s regulatory capacities. Experts from German and Italian regulators for 
telecoms visited Egypt in 2008, to approximate Egyptian regulations with the EU framework 
(Progress Report, 2009:6). In 2009, NTRA continued to align its regulatory framework with 
the EU’s; by improving licensing, competition and regulation of interconnections (Progress 
Report, 2010:6). The impact of the 2009 financial crisis, however, was observed in the sector 
when the procedure to grant a second fixed license was postponed. No new developments 
have occurred in the following year regarding the introduction of a second fixed telephony 
license and therefore the market remained as a monopoly (Progress Report, 2011). 
Nevertheless, NTRA and its affiliated ministry appeared rather committed to regulatory 
reforms until the political environment has rapidly changed in 2012. 
 
Clearly, the progress in the telecommunications sector and the autonomy granted to the 
NTRA remained linked to the political situation- the Arab Spring. In 2012, especially, ENP 
stated that the progress in regulatory reform had ceased in Egypt (Progress Report, 2012:6). 
It also (2013:6) reported that Vodafone Egypt and other network operators were instructed 
in January 2011 to suspend services in selected areas. Moreover, the internet was suspended 
for around a week and mobile communications for two days. Most network operators 
complied with government instructions. In addition to the political situation, the international 
financial crisis had affected the telecommunications market.  For example, plans to liberalize 
the fixed line market have been postponed due to the international financial crisis. In an 
environment of crisis both economically and politically, the Egyptian NTRA could not 
preserve its formal independence (ITU ICT Eye, 2013). The approval of the Sector Minister 
for regulatory decisions became formally obligatory and NTRA stopped reporting to the 
Prime Minister and only reported to the Sector Minister starting from 2013 (ITU, 2013). 
 
Although political rights turned out to be the most significant predictor of agency 
independence in this thesis, looking at the time-series freedom in political rights in Egypt 
reveals that the year that the score on political rights slightly improved (Freedom House, 
2013) is the year that the NTRA lost its formal autonomy in decision making (ITU ICT Eye, 
	
4
2 
2013). Due to a state of emergency, the government centralized control of the 
telecommunications market in its hands. Another significant explanatory variable of the 
agency independence, investment freedom, appears to be confirmed when cross-temporal 
change is observed. Autonomy loss of the agency and freedom loss in investment coincided 
in the same year. In 2013, the level of investment freedom was reduced by the Heritage 
Foundation (2013) to 50 (over 100), although it had been recorded as 65 in the previous year.  
 
Loss of autonomy of the Egyptian NTRA in 2013 has concurred in the same year when 
political change occurred and freedom in economy was lost. Political and economic change 
and uncertainties affected the regulatory independence because the government centralized 
the control of the telecommunications in its hands in this state of emergency. 
 
5.6 Jordan 
 
 
The Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) of Jordan was established as a 
financially and administratively independent jurisdictional body through the 
Telecommunications Law No 13 of 1995 and is subsequent amending law No.8 of 2002. It 
is one of the oldest regulatory bodies in Jordan. The primary function of the TRC is to 
regulate the telecommunications and information technology service sectors, as well as the 
postal sector according to the Postal Law No 34 of 2007 in Jordan. 
 
The TRC has been reported as independent in decision making since 2006 (ITU, 2016). No 
formal change has occurred in its independence in terms of its budget fund, reporting 
requirements and competences. From 2006 to 2015, it had the obligation to report to the 
Prime Minister; its competences were monetary fines, license suspension, license revocation 
and some other additional obligations pursuant to separate regulations; and its budget was 
financed by license fees (55.8%), spectrum fees (42.6%) and regulatory fees (fines and 
penalties 0.10%). 
 
The TRC has requested progress in its de facto independence in the last ten years. In March 
2009, for example, when the Director General of the TRC resigned, he justified his decision 
with reference to TRC’s lack of independence and political interference (The Arap Daily, 
	
4
3 
13.03.1999). Changes in the constitution in 2011, resulting in a loss of recognition for 
independent authorities, affected the sector and have been implemented directly without 
amending the telecommunications law. TRC has advised that amendments are being 
developed to the primary law that are expected to align the law with EU framework 
requirements with respect to a range of issues including making TRC more independent and 
improving general governance and authority (EBRD, 2012). The TRC’s Board of 
Commissioners and the current chairman, Ghazi Salem Al-Jobor (appointed in June 
2015), are appointed by a resolution from the Council of Ministers based on a nomination 
from the prime minister20. 
 
Jordan has adopted a new national strategy for the development of the ICT covering the years 
2007-2011. This strategy was based on four pillars: investment and regulation, research and 
development, labor and education, and connectivity. In 2008, the TRC was engaged in a 
number of decisions aimed to increase competition in the telecommunications sector. These 
decisions included the introduction of carrier selection for fixed telephony and of dispute 
resolution procedures in 2007 as well as the creation of a universal service fund in 2008 
(Progress Report, 2008). In 2009, the TRC proceeded to increase the competition in the 
market by publishing a tender for a license to provide 3G (Third Generation Mobile 
Services); authorizing the provision of mobile virtual network operator services; and issuing 
a public consultation on local loop unbundling (Progress Report, 2009). In 2010 and 2011, 
the TRC and the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications (MoICT) 
continued to implement information society policies in cooperation. A request from the TRC 
to introduce a fourth mobile operator in December 2012 was rejected by Zain and Jordan 
Telecom21. No new providers have been introduced after then and the three companies have 
a comparable share of the market (Freedom House, 2015)22. 
 
The TRC has adopted its Strategic Plan 2010-2013 in which one of the main objectives is to 
ensure effective regulations and fair competition in the ICT sectors. A twinning project 
                                                
20 TRC, Telecommunication Law No. (13) of 1995, January 10, 1995, pg 18, accessed June 26,2013,http://bit.ly/1KWfNtT. 
21 Ghazzal, Mohammad, “Orange Jordan Opposes TRC Plan,” The Jordan Times, December 15, 2012, accessed April 30, 
2013 http://bit.ly/1ECBaO5.	
22 Mai Barakat, “Jordan will be challenging, but a fourth operator might find elbow room as a mobile broadband 
provider,” Ovum, February 21, 2013, http://bit.ly/1JBMhUg. 
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supported by the EU named "Institutional Strengthening of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission in Jordan" started in September 2011 (Progress Report, 2012). For 
2012-2016, a new National Information and Communication Technology Strategy was 
prepared with the EU maintenance. Further steps were taken to reinforce the independence 
and administrative capacity of the TRC. In February 2014, the TRC chaired and hosted the 
assembly meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Regulators Group (EMERG) (Progress Report, 
2015). 
 
Jordan’s level on the freedom of political rights has decreased from 5 to 6 in 2009 (Freedom 
House, 2009), coinciding with the chairman’s resignation due to political inference in March 
2009. Its score has not changed since then. Investment freedom, however, has had a gradual 
increase starting from 2006. While it was measured as 50 over 100 in 2006, it increased to 
70 in 2011 and remained as such in the following years23 (Heritage, 2015). Jordan has been 
ranked 39th globally and 4th regionally on the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, witnessing 
a decline in its international standing but maintaining the same level regionally compared to 
2013’s index. Heritage Foundation report (2014) on Jordan economy wrote: “Despite the 
region’s ongoing political and security challenges, Jordan’s economy has been resilient. The 
economy has benefited from earlier years’ reform agenda in the areas of privatization”. The 
same trend has been observed in the regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector. It 
has pushed for a competitive sector both in the nation and the region. 
 
Jordanian government, when faced with political challenges, did not centralized the control 
of telecommunications market as the Egyptian government did. Its preservation of regulatory 
independence over years corresponds to its higher levels of economic freedom among other 
countries. Further, commitment to reform the regulatory framework in line with the EU 
practice was much more observable in Jordan24 than in other three countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 World average is 50.7	
24 In ENP Progress Reports. 
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5.7 Morocco 
 
The National Agency for the Regulation of Telecommunications (ANRT) was created in 
1998 to regulate and liberalize the telecommunications sector as an independent government 
body. ANRT in the founding law was nominated to favor the competition among operators 
and to create an efficient regulation for the operators25. EBRD (2012) dates the liberalization 
of the telecom sector as 2006, although the attempts have started in 1997 and re-launched 
unsuccessfully in 2002. In 2006, two new fixed licenses were awarded. The appointment of 
the regulatory head and board of ANRT is realized by a royal decree (Dahir), causing 
criticisms for lack of agency independence, according to Freedom in the Net report of 
Freedom House (2013). ANRT’s board of directors is made up of government ministers; 
therefore, dismissal of the regulatory head and board by the King of Morocco is possible 
(Freedom House, 2015). Clear criteria and conditions for appointment and dismissal based 
on technocratic knowledge are missing. 
 
The agency has been reported by ITU ICT Eye as autonomous in decision making in 2006- 
the year that the market has gone through reforms and liberalization. However, its status has 
been changed to non-autonomous in 2007, and back to autonomous in 2008 till the present 
day. ITU has not reported any coverage on the reason of this autonomy loss in 2007. The 
reason might be that the restructuring phrase had affected the institutional and interpersonal 
dynamics of the agency, leading to political interference. 
 
According to ENP Progress Report (2006), since 2005, the ANRT is committed to enforce 
competition in electronic communications and market liberalization. There were three 
operators on the fixed telephony market; and three licenses for 3G mobile communications 
were allocated in October 2006. 2007 ENP Progress Report emphasizes that the success of 
the liberalization of the market is evidenced by the growth in both figures in all segments, 
i.e. fixed telephony, mobile telephony and the Internet. In addition, the regulatory framework 
                                                
25 Lois régissant la poste et les télécommunications (Laws governing the post and telecommunications), available online 
athttp://www.anrt.ma/fr/admin/download/upload/file_fr1825.pdf 
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of the ANRT continued to advance in 2007, for example through the introduction of number 
portability. 
 
Maroc Telecom, Medi Telecom, and INWI are the three internet service providers (ISPs) and 
mobile phone companies in Morocco. In the context of liberalization of the sector, Moroccan 
government in 2009 sold some of its shares in Maroc Telecom, former state monopoly 
(Progress Report, 2008). In the same year, the ANRT granted licenses for Medi Telecom and 
INWI. In 2010, Maroc Telecom signed an agreement with the ANRT for the COVENANT 
(access to telecommunication) program to cover access to rural areas and invest in these 
provinces.  
 
The Arab Spring, Freedom House reports (2013), has changed the government behavior of 
intervention to delete or block online content. In the environment of post-Arab Spring, 
government wants to show its efforts to implement democratic reforms. Many websites that 
were previously blocked such as YouTube and Facebook are opened to access. It applies for 
regulatory reform as well. (ENP Progress Report, 2014). In 2012, the government adopted a 
ten-year national plan to develop ultra-fast broadband connections and assigned ANRT in 
charge of the implementation of the plan.  ENP Progress Report in 2014 acknowledged that 
Morocco is rather advanced in terms of connectivity, equipment and uses. In early 2014 it 
planned to launch a tender for granting 4G licenses. All three companies have submitted 
applications for 4G mobile phone licenses, following the call for tenders from the ANRT. 
 
The score of Morocco on political rights has not changed in these years under examination 
(2006-2015) except for an increase in 2014 from the score 6 to 3. Investment freedom, 
according to Heritage Foundation, has decreased from 70 to 60 in 2008 and remained as such 
in the following two years. In 2011 it has slightly improved (to 65) and in 2013 it has 
measured as 70 (over 100). No significant impact of investment freedom and political rights 
has been observed in relation to agency independence over years. Nevertheless, political 
change has affected the behavior of the government positively regarding the initiations of 
regulatory reforms. 
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5.8 Tunisia 
 
The National Instance of Telecommunication (INT) was created in 2001 through Law No 
1/2001 (15.01.2001) as the regulator for all telecom and internet-related activities and has 
the responsibility of resolving technical issues and disputes between actors. The INT board 
and the head of the board are nominated by the ICT minister and come mainly from 
government ministries and agencies, which causes a decrease in its formal independence. 
ITU ICT Eye (2016) reported the INT as autonomous in decision making every year since 
2006 except 2011. In late 2011, the Management Council of the INT has started to approve 
its budget which can be seen as a positive improvement. EBRD (2012) reported that Law 
1/2001 and other decrees that comprise the sector framework overlaps and conflicts, creating 
confusion about some issues. In addition, some functions, such as licensing and spectrum 
administration, that are typically assigned to a regulatory agency in other countries are 
implemented in Tunisia by the Ministry of ICT. Freedom House in the Net (2015) reported 
that the INT has introduced new licensing regulations and continues to take steps to ensure 
greater transparency and accountability. Currently, the INT can issue monetary fines and 
suspend licenses and its budget is made up of numbering fees by 100%. ENP Progress Report 
(2006) advised that Tunisia should complete its regulatory framework for electronic 
communications and consolidate the INT. 
 
Starting from 2007, Tunisia planned opening up the telephony market and awarding a third 
mobile license to liberalize markets, promote competition and encourage investment. ENP 
Progress Report in 2007, nevertheless, recognized that the regulatory framework remains 
incomplete and the independence of the regulator must be strengthened. Tunisia has passed 
legislation that allows the full liberalization of the fixed market in 2009 (EBRD, 2012). 2009 
was highlighted by the EU as the year of efforts by the Tunisian government to reform the 
sectors of ICT and information society. A law has been passed to revise the code of 
communications for an up-to-date regulatory framework (Progress Report, 2009). Yet, the 
state-controlled Tunisie Télécom maintains a monopoly over the country’s fixed market and 
domestic internet backbone. However, there is competition in the mobile sector with three 
mobile operators. In May 2010, the entry of a third operator, Orange Tunisie has modified 
the existing duopoly of Tunisie Telecom and Orascom in seven years. Although the 
	
4
8 
liberalization has led to competition for mobile operators and internet, the state still held 
shares in the three main operators by year 2011 (Progress Report, 2012). 
 
The main suppliers of internet service are Tunisie Télécom, Ooredoo Tunisie, and Orange 
Tunisie. The state controls a 65 % stake in Tunisie Télécom. Ooredoo Tunisie is owned by 
the state of Qatar and Orange Tunisie has been controlled by the Tunisian state since 2011. 
In 2015, Tunisie Telecom remained as the sole manager of the country’s 10,000 km internet 
backbone covering the territory and it has the authorization to resell domestic ISPs which 
gives Tunisie Telecom an oversized role in the country’s internet governance (Freedom 
House in the Net, 2015).  
 
The level of freedom in political rights in Tunisia has seen an unsteady trend. In 2006 and 
2007, it was measured as 6 (over 7). From 2008 till 2012, it had reached to the least free 
condition: 7. During that period, regulatory independence of the Tunisian INT was 
undermined formally and informally through means of autonomy loss in decision making. In 
2012, its political rights rating has increased to 3, coinciding with the year of regulatory 
reform initiations. Also, investment freedom stayed very low compared to the country’s pairs 
in the region. It slightly improved from 30 to 35 in 2010 but has not changed ever since. 
 
In 2015, Tunisia’s political rights rating improved from 3 to 1 and its status improved from 
Partly Free to Free “due to the adoption of a progressive constitution, governance 
improvements under a consensus-based caretaker administration, and the holding of free and 
fair parliamentary and presidential elections, all with a high degree of transparency” 
(Freedom House, 2015). A reflection of the current political environment in the level of 
regulatory independence cannot be observed formally yet. 
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5.9 Comparison and Discussion 
 
A closer look at regulatory independence in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia over time 
(from 2006 to 2015) has confirmed that formal independence cannot be preserved as once 
and for all. Governments who were willing to delegate authority to independent regulators 
may undermine not only de facto, but also formal independence of agencies over time 
through means of budget control, dispossession of competences and autonomy loss in 
decision making. Although McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989) have anticipated that the 
threats of new legislation to undermine agency autonomy are useless because it damages the 
original coalition establishing initial directive of the agency, empirical evidence has shown 
that changes in the legislation to undermine agency independence occurs when political and 
economic stakes are high. Their conclusion, therefore, does not account especially for the 
instances in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia and to some extent in Jordan. 
 
 
Formal Independence and Political Change. 
Even though Gilardi (2005), looking at European countries, observed that regulators tend to 
be more independent in countries where political uncertainties are high, evidence from ENP-
South countries suggests the opposite26. Political uncertainties have led these countries’ 
governments to take control of the market and its regulation by undermining agency 
independence both in de facto and de jure terms. 
 
Telecommunications sector holds political stakes involved due to (1) privatization of the 
numerous state-owned telecommunications operators, (2) liberalization of the fixed and 
mobile telecom markets and opening up the market to competition, (3) extensive growth of 
internet, mobile and wireless services and (4) development of international trade in 
telecommunications services. Waves of political change affect the market as well as the 
governance of the sectors. When political change has swept through the Arab world, it had 
an impact on the bureaucracy and the institutions governing the market whose operation 
affects the interests of the actors in the government. The governments of the region have 
                                                
26 This conclusion cannot be generalized for all middle-income countries though. 
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centralized economic and political powers as well as the bureaucratic rule. The impact of the 
Arab spring and political change has been observed in the independence of the INT, Tunisian 
telecoms regulator. Political instabilities in Egypt had a negative impact on the independence 
of the NTRA, resulting in loss of autonomy in decision making.  Morocco has pushed efforts 
in regulatory independence in the post-Arab spring environment yet undermined it in 2011. 
Jordan presents a different case than the other three countries because despite of the fact that 
the country has gone through political challenges, Jordan’s economy, telecommunications 
market and the TRC (its telecoms regulator) have been resilient. 
 
The behavior towards regulatory independence coincided with the governments’ response to 
political change. Countries that take measures to suppress political change (like Egypt) had 
undermined formal independence more than countries that try to keep on the right side of the 
change (like Morocco). 
 
Ratings of freedom in political rights for 2006-2015 have been presented in the Graph 5 
below. Spots show the year of regulatory change respective to the countries. 
 
Graph 5: Political Rights Freedom in Years 
	
Source: Freedom House (2015) 
 
	
5
1 
Graph 5 illustrates that a negative political change in Egypt and its IRA’s autonomy loss have 
coincided in 2014. After its regulatory authority’s autonomy loss in 2011, Tunisia’s efforts 
to reform regulatory framework have also coincided with a positive change in political rights 
in 2012. No impact of political change has been observed for Morocco. In Jordan, on the 
other hand, although political rights freedom decreases in 2008, it has not affected the 
government behavior towards regulatory independence negatively. Economic indicators 
explain more for regulatory independence in Jordan than political ones. 
 
Formal Independence, Market and Economic Freedom.  
Levi-Faur (2003) suggests that in industries that require long term investment, independent 
agencies offer a stable investment climate and predictable rules. Greater levels of economic 
freedom, therefore, is a predictor of agency independence showing the enthusiasm of 
governments towards the establishment of regulatory agencies. It does, however, changes 
over time following the uncertainties faced by the government economically and politically. 
 
To varying degrees, all of the four economies are negatively affected by the global slowdown 
(EBRD, 2012). Yet, in terms of economic freedom, there is a legal basis for new entrance in 
all telecommunications markets of the four countries. During the last ten years, they all have 
passed legislation allowing the full liberalization of the sector, most recently in Tunisia in 
2009. In practice, however, state interest remains in dominant fixed network incumbent 
operators. 
 
Levels of investment freedom in the years 1995-2016 are presented for Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia below in Graph 6. Plots represent the year of change in regulatory 
independence. 
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Graph 6: Investment Freedom in Years 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2015) 
 
The level of investment freedom sharply decreases for Egypt in 2012, coinciding with the 
year of the autonomy loss of its IRA. When Morocco regained its autonomy in decision 
making in 2008, its investment freedom also has been stabilized for three years. No 
correlation of investment freedom and regulatory independence in years has been observed 
for Tunisia and Jordan. 
 
Graph 7 below demonstrates the change in the levels of economic freedom in the last ten 
years. Numbers next to lines show the measured levels of regulatory independence. In the 
years under examination, from 2006 to 2015, economic freedom slightly improved in 2008 
and merged at the same level for Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in 2009 and 2010. After, it 
worsened for Egypt while remained unchanged for Tunisia and Morocco. Jordan, on the other 
hand, has taken a different tack in terms of economic freedom with a rating of “Mostly Free”. 
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Graph 7: Levels of Economic Freedom in Years* 
 
*Numbers next to lines represent measured levels of agency independence in 2014. 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
 
Graph 7 illustrates that countries’ relative levels of economic freedom also corresponds to 
their rankings in terms of agency independence. The correlation between economic freedom 
and agency independence, thus, is confirmed cross-temporally for these four selected 
countries. Egypt, as the country with lowest level of regulatory independence (0.2) among 
others, shows the lowest level of economic freedom as well.  
 
Jordan is the only country among others that did not initiate a change in the formal 
independence of the agency. Jordan’s higher scores compared to other three countries in 
terms of economic freedom coincided with its higher levels of agency independence vis-a-
vis others. Especially after 2010, when the TRC has adopted a new national strategy for ICT 
development and aimed institutional strengthening of the agency; and economic freedom as 
well was in a positive path. Morocco follows Jordan in the levels of economic freedom, and 
the two countries’ measured level of formal independence is identical (0.6). Tunisia is ranked 
third among four countries regarding both the economic freedom and regulatory 
independence. 
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Formal Independence and the EU Regulatory Directive. 
The EU regulatory framework includes good practices in the area of ex-ante regulation when 
applied specifically to relevant electronic communications markets (EBRD, 2012). In all four 
countries, the EU has pushed for regulatory reform through ENP Association Agreement and 
series of action plans, for them to apply the EU regulatory framework. One of the 
requirements of the EU directive was regulatory independence for an effective and credible 
regulation. Commitment to European regulatory framework directive, for all four countries, 
appeared highly auxiliary in this phase. Looking at the ENP Progress Reports, Jordan, among 
others, appear as the most committed to regulatory reform. Its stability in terms of regulatory 
independence as well confirms that dedications matters on the government behavior to not 
undermine autonomy of IRAs. 
 
Nevertheless, some governments have intervened with the regulatory decisions even though 
the initial mandate of delegation advices the opposite. The irreversibility of the reforms, 
therefore, are in question. Political and economic instabilities surely affect the government 
behavior towards regulatory independence. Even though all four countries were willing to 
work on regulatory reform and liberalization of the market when they first created their IRAs, 
especially Egypt, and to some extent Morocco and Tunisia, could not risk regulatory 
decisions that are politically independent of the government partly due to the importance of 
those decisions to the daily politics and partly to economic stability. Their governments have 
broken initial formal agency independence to have discretion over policy making even 
though it would make it more difficult to credibly bind themselves in the future. 
 
Although it is not possible to generalize the experiences of the four countries to all developing 
economies, formal change in regulatory independence have occurred in other middle income 
economies as well. South Africa and Mongolia, for example, present successful cases in 
terms of an increase in the independence of their telecommunications agency. South African 
telecommunications regulatory authority, ICASA, gained autonomy in decision making in 
2014; whereas Mongolian telecoms regulator CRC was granted with enforcement power in 
2008. Ukrainian regulator NKZI, on the other hand, lost its enforcement power in 2010 and 
regained it in 2011. The change in NKZI’s enforcement power caused by a series global 
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recession that its economy has gone through and increase in presidential influence over the 
judiciary and governmental institutions (see Freedom House: Ukraine, 2011). 
 
A significant predictor of the loss of regulatory autonomy appears to be the reporting 
requirements, budget financing and competences. Countries committed to a regulatory 
reform have dropped the obligation to report to Sector Minister, such as Mongolia and South 
Africa, whereas countries with governments in demand of regulatory control have obligated 
annual reports to sector ministry, such as Montenegro in 2013. Serbian (2011) and Polish 
(2013) governments have used budget control as a way to monitor their regulatory agencies, 
whereas Romania and Poland in 2014 preferred reducing the competencies of the agency 
from license suspension/revocation to monetary fines solely. Political and economic 
instabilities cause decrease in formal agency independence by dispossessing decision making 
autonomy of the agency as in the cases of Egypt, Kyrgyzstan and Morocco. 
  
All in all, empirical analysis has shown that regulatory independence might not be preserved 
as once and for all in some countries, as governments may use formal mechanisms to 
undermine regulatory independence even though they have initially mandated autonomy to 
those agencies and invested in their foundation. Four countries under examination have 
varied in their responses to political change and this variation coincided with the change in 
agency independence. Political interference benefited more than blame-shifting and credible 
future promises to some countries in the face of political and economic uncertainties as 
happened in Egypt and Tunisia when widespread political change happened. Commitment to 
EU regulatory framework played a role to not fully undermine regulatory independence in 
the case of Morocco and especially Jordan. Even though Moroccan and Tunisian regulators 
have gone through changes in formal mechanisms such as budget control, appointment and 
competencies, these governments did not fully undermine their formal agency independence. 
Moreover, the governments’ behavior towards freedom in economy have coincided with their 
behavior towards agency independence. In Jordan, especially, even though the country’s 
rating of political rights is low compared to others (except Egypt), its openness towards 
economic freedom covaried with delegation towards regulatory independence. 
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Chapter 6. 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1 Findings 
 
This thesis presented results based on quantitative cross-national analysis of regulatory 
independence for 36 countries’ agencies and qualitative cross-temporal analysis of agency 
independence for 4 countries’ (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia) agencies in the past 10 
years. It examined formal independence mechanisms to measure the level of independence 
and focused on middle-income countries. 
 
It overviewed main theoretical and empirical theories on independent regulatory agencies. In 
the theoretical part, it introduced normative and functional approaches along with contextual 
factors to delegation of authority and discussed their contribution to cross-national and cross-
temporal research. It built a theoretical foundation on the variation in the regulatory 
independence based on three cluster of determinants: economic development, political 
system and market structure. 
 
The statistical analysis on the variations in formal independence revealed significant cross-
national differences. This thesis has confirmed that countries with greater levels of regulatory 
independence are positively associated with the degree to which they have freedom in 
political rights and investment. Cross-national analysis from middle income countries has 
shown that formal regulatory independence is determined by the democracy level, meaning 
that the more countries are democratic, the more they grant independence to their regulatory 
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agencies in legal terms. The effect of state ownership in the market is consistent with the 
previous literature on advanced economies. Countries with telecommunications markets that 
are led by state ownership are less prone to grant greater degrees of formal independence. It 
occurs mostly due to the simultaneous progress on privatization of the sector and creation of 
independent regulatory agencies. Countries that are less enthusiastic about the privatization 
of the sector tended to grant less independence to their regulatory agencies afterwards, 
considering that one of the missions of these IRAs was to promote competition in the market. 
 
Income level (GDP per capita) does not show an impact on the independence of the 
regulatory agencies. It is, therefore, not possible to claim that economic development brings 
regulatory independence. It is, however, possible to argue that countries with markets that 
are more open to investment tend to grant more levels of regulatory independence. 
Investment necessitates credibility and predictability which are the features that IRAs offer 
through their independence. In Jordan, for example, even though the country’s rating of 
political rights is low compared to others, its openness towards economic freedom covaried 
with its delegation behavior towards regulatory independence. 
 
In addition, countries with presidential form of government, compared to the mixed and 
parliamentary forms, grant lower levels of agency independence in the telecom sector. The 
most likely explanation is the changing behavior on delegation of power in those three forms 
of government. 
 
Cross-temporal analysis, looking at four countries’ formal independence mechanisms from 
2006 to 2016, has confirmed that formal independence cannot be preserved as once and for 
all. Governments who were willing to delegate authority to independent regulators may 
undermine not only de facto, but also formal independence of agencies over time through 
means of budget control, dispossession of competences and autonomy loss in decision 
making. Political change, economic freedom and commitment to EU regulatory directive 
have been identified in this thesis as three determinants of the change in agency independence 
in time. Political uncertainties might lead countries’ governments to take control of the 
market and its regulation by undermining agency independence both in de facto and de jure 
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terms. Countries’ relative levels of economic freedom also corresponds to their ranking in 
terms of agency independence. Moreover, commitment to EU regulatory framework plays a 
role in governments’ behavior to preserve formal independence mechanisms. 
 
By bringing cross-national and cross-temporal results together, this thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by demonstrating variation in regulatory independence across nations and 
across time. The contribution also speaks to the previous research and states the importance 
of domestic factors in the study of regulatory independence. Determinants of this variation 
are identified for middle income countries as differences in levels of democracy, openness 
towards investment, market structure and form of government. This thesis finds a link 
between democratic freedom and variation in formal independence of national telecom 
regulators. It also accounts for the relationship between the form of government and 
regulatory independence. Compared to parliamentary and mixed forms of governments, 
presidential regimes tend to delegate less authority to IRAs. Additionally, the structure of the 
market and investment freedom is confirmed to demonstrate an explanatory potential in 
regulatory independence; in contrast to the framework of income level, which is proven to 
have a weak explanatory potential for middle income countries. It also finds, thanks to the 
merits of cross-temporal analysis, that although the democracy level has the most explanatory 
power in explaining the cross-national variation in regulatory independence, it remains rather 
insufficient to explain cross-temporal differences within countries themselves (e.g. Jordan). 
Responses to political and economic shocks and uncertainties explain the cross-temporal 
differences in formal independence of IRAs as occurred in Egypt, Morocco and to some 
extent Tunisia. Future research might measure regulatory independence by year and come up 
with a comprehensive research by integrating cross-national and cross-temporal dimensions. 
 
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
This thesis has several limitations, the most important of which are due to data constraints. 
To conduct a study by considering the timing of the data collection for different countries, it 
relies on the data available at the ITU ICT Eye. In the quantitative section, it has only added 
the data in which its collection dates to 2014. Thus, many middle income countries’ agencies 
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were removed from the research to have a systematical and consistent dataset. In response to 
this challenge, the data gathered on the institutional design of the telecom regulators reflects 
the situation at December 2014. Changes in the legislative framework that have occurred 
since December 2014 are not reflected in the dataset and were excluded from the quantitative 
analysis. In the qualitative part, the data was collected for ten years between 2006-2015 
thanks to small number of indicators and observations. 
 
Longitudinal data tracing the evolution over time in formal independence is available only 
through ITU ICT Eye for regulatory agencies. It includes, however, missing data for many 
years and many agencies. Therefore, this thesis could only observe four countries’ agencies 
by integrating the time dimension. Due to the small number of observations, this thesis 
employed a qualitative method to observe this dimension. Future research might integrate 
time dimension in the comparison of the formal independence for a large number of 
observations. 
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Appendix A:  
Formal Independence of Independent Regulatory Agencies: independence index 
 
Status of the agency head                                                      Weight               Coding 
                                                                                                  0.20 
 
 Term of office 
• over 8 years                                                                            1.00 
• 6 to 8 years                                                                             0.80 
• 5 years                                                                                    0.60 
• 4 years                                                                                    0.40 
• fixed term under 4 years or at the discretion of the  
appointer                                                                                   0.20 
• no fixed term                                                                          0.00 
Who appoints the agency head? 
•the members of the management board                                  1.00 
•a complex mix of the parliament and the government            0.75 
•the parliament                                                                          0.50 
•the government collectively                                                    0.25 
•one or two ministers                                                                0.00 
Dismissal 
•dismissal is impossible                                                            1.00 
•dismissal is possible, but only for reasons not related to  
policy                                                                                         0.67 
•there are no specific provisions for dismissal                          0.33 
•dismissal is possible at the appointer‘s discretion                   0.00 
May the agency head hold other offices in government? 
•no                                                                                             1.00 
•only with the permission of the government                           0.50 
•yes / no specific provisions                                                     0.00 
Is the appointment renewable? 
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•no                                                                                            1.00 
•yes, once                                                                                 0.50 
•yes, more than once                                                                0.00 
Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment 
•yes                                                                                         1.00 
•no                                                                                           0.00 
 
 
Status of the management board                                             Weight               Coding 
                                                                                                  0.20 
 
Term of office 
• over 8 years                                                                            1.00 
• 6 to 8 years                                                                             0.80 
• 5 years                                                                                    0.60 
• 4 years                                                                                    0.40 
• fixed term under 4 years or at the discretion of the  
appointer                                                                                   0.20 
• no fixed term                                                                          0.00 
Who appoints the member of the board? 
•the members of the management board                                  1.00 
•a complex mix of the parliament and the government            0.75 
•the parliament                                                                          0.50 
•the government collectively                                                    0.25 
•one or two ministers                                                                0.00 
Dismissal 
•dismissal is impossible                                                            1.00 
•dismissal is possible, but only for reasons not related to  
policy                                                                                         0.67 
•there are no specific provisions for dismissal                          0.33 
•dismissal is possible at the appointer‘s discretion                   0.00 
May the members of the board hold other offices in 
	
7
5 
government? 
•no                                                                                             1.00 
•only with the permission of the government                           0.50 
•yes / no specific provisions                                                      0.00 
Is the appointment renewable? 
•no                                                                                             1.00 
•yes, once                                                                                  0.50 
•yes, more than once                                                                 0.00 
 
 
Relationship with government and parliament                     Weight               Coding 
                                                                                                  0.20 
 
Is the independence of the agency formally stated? 
• yes                                                                                          1.00 
• no                                                                                            0.00 
What are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis the government? 
• there are no formal obligations                                              1.00 
• presentation of an annual report for information only           0.67 
• presentation of an annual report that must be approved        0.33 
• the agency is fully accountable to the government                0.00 
What are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis the parliament? 
• there are no formal obligations                                              1.00 
• presentation of an annual report for information only           0.67 
• presentation of an annual report that must be approved        0.33 
• the agency is fully accountable to the parliament                  0.00 
Which body, other than a court, can overturn the decisions of the agency where 
the latter has exclusive competence? 
• no body                                                                                  1.00 
• a specialised body                                                                  0.67 
• the government, with qualifications                                      0.33 
• the government, unconditionally                                           0.00 
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Financial and Organizational Autonomy                               Weight               Coding 
                                                                                                  0.20 
 
What is the source of the agency‘s budget? 
• fees levied on the regulated industry                                     1.00 
• both the government and fees levied on the regulated 
 industry                                                                                   0.50 
• the government                                                                      0.00 
How is the budget controlled? 
• by the agency                                                                        1.00 
• by the accounting office or court                                          0.67 
• by both the agency and the government                               0.33 
• by the government only                                                        0.00 
Which body decides on the agency‘s internal organization? 
• the agency                                                                             1.00 
• both the agency and the government                                    0.50 
• the government                                                                     0.00 
Which body is in charge of the agency‘s personnel policy 
(hiring and firing staff, deciding on its allocation and 
composition)? 
• the agency                                                                             1.00 
• both the agency and the government                                    0.50 
• the government                                                                     0.00 
 
 
Regulatory Competences                                                        Weight               Coding 
                                                                                                  0.20 
 
• the agency only                                                                      1.00 
• the agency and another independent authority                       0.75 
• the agency and the parliament                                                0.50 
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• the agency and the government                                              0.25 
• the agency has only consultative competencies                     0.00 
 
Adopted from Gilardi (2002) 
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Appendix B:  
LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Egypt 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Malaysia 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
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Slovenia 
South Africa 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
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